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DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP 
Paul E. Basye* 
NEARLY a hundred years have elapsed since the Supreme Court emphatically voiced its conviction as to the necessity 
of having some method for making a final determination concern-
ing the devolution of the ownership of property upon the death 
of its mvner. In the Case of Broderick's Will-Justice Bradley said: 
"The public interest requires that the estates of deceased 
persons, being deprived of a master, and subject to all manner 
of claim, should at once devolve to a new and competent own-
ership; and, consequently, that there should be some con-
venient jurisdiction and mode of proceeding by which this 
devolution may be effected with least chance of injustice and 
fraud; and that the result attained should be firm and per-
petual. "1 -
The method or procedure by which we determine the persons 
who are entitled to succeed to a decedent's real property varies 
quite widely in this country and the trend of its development is 
noteworthy. In some states the determination is quite informal 
and may even be contained as a recital in a self-serving affidavit or 
deed. Elsewhere it is the solemn pronouncement of a probate 
court in a decree of distribution of real property as the final step in 
a formal administration proceeding which has subjected real as 
well as personal property to its judicial supervision. Various in-
termediate procedures have been developed by specific legislation 
to effect a declaration or determination of heirship or of devisees 
under varying circumsta~ces. Such a determination which will 
satisfy the most meticulous demand for a marketable title may even 
•Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law; A.B. 1923, Uni-
versity of Missouri; J.D. 1926, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1943, S.J.D. 1946, University 
of Michigan; member, California bar; co-draftsman of Model Probate Code and of Model 
Small Estates Act; former Chairman, Model Probate Code Committee of Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Section, American Bar Association; co-author with Professor Lewis M. 
Simes of Problems in Probate Law, Including a Model Probate Code; author, Clearing 
Land Titles.-Ed. 
121 Wall. (88 U.S.) 503 at 509 (1874). 
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be made in the absence of administration or as ancillary to a formal 
administration. In this study we shall analyze and appraise the 
procedures which exist for determining the persons who are en-
titled to succeed to the real property of a decedent upon his death. 
In order to understand more fully the effectiveness of these 
various procedures, it will be helpful to consider first the jurisdic-
tion which probate courts exercise over real property. According 
to tradition, title to the personal property of a decedent passed to 
his personal representative and thence to his next of kin or 
legatees.2 The executor or administrator collected all of the per-
sonal property belonging to the decedent and all debts owing to 
him.3 In time he became charged also with payment of the de-
cedent's debts and of any legacies provided for in a will.4 After 
discharging these tasks he distributed the remaining personalty to 
the next of kin or legatees. As probate procedure developed, this 
distribution was made by the personal representative pursuant to 
a decree of the court having jurisdiction over his activities.5 This 
decree was important for two purposes: (1) it commanded the 
personal representative to make the distribution; and (2) it deter-
mined the persons to whom he should make it.6 The significant 
aspect of this procedure for our present consideration is that the 
court exercising testamentary jurisdiction assumed and exercised 
the prerogative of determining the identity of next of kin or 
legatees. This determination was basic in tracing one's title to 
personal property. 
In contrast to the course of devolution of the ownership of per-
sonal property, title to land belonging to a decedent did not follow 
this same path of going to the personal representative and thence 
to the heir or devisee. Ecclesiastical courts under early English 
law did not exercise jurisdiction over land.7 Accordingly it be-
came the established pattern that upon the death of a d~cedent the 
ownership of land devolved directly upon the heir or devisee.8 
2ATKINSON~ WILLS, 2d ed., §§103, 104 (1953); 3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952). 
3 3 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952); Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testa-
mentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. REv. 107 at 110-111 (1943). 
4 3 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952); Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testa-
mentary Jurisdiction," 8 Mo. L. REv. 107 at 113 (1943). 
5 3 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §§561, 570 (1923); 3 AM. LAW 
OF PROPERTY §14.43 (1952); ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., §103 (1953); Atkinson, "The Develop-
ment of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42 MICH. L. REv. 425 at 436, 4!!7, 444-446, 
448-451 (1943). 
6ATKmsoN, WILLS, 2d ed., §143 (1953). 
7 3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952). 
Sibid. 
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The reasoning behind this difference was historical. Land was 
not liable for a decedent's debts under early law.9 The heir him-
self was liable in some instances.10 The executor or administra-
tor was truly a personal representative, that is, he had control over 
personalty only, not over realty.11 It was not until the end of the 
nineteenth century that a legislative change was wrought in this 
matter under English law.12 Only since then has the executor or 
administrator been given any of the rights, powers and duties over 
land corresponding to those of an owner. 
In the early statutes of several of the New England states, there 
was some indication that personal representatives might be given 
title to land as well as to personalty.13 Likewise a California 
statute taken from the New York Field Code was included in the 
Civil Code of 1872 to provide: 
"The property, both real and personal, of any one who dies 
without disposing of it by will, passes, in the first instance, to 
the personal representative of such person as Trustee: I. To 
make the provision for the surviving husband, or wife, or 
child, which is directed by title XI of part III, of the Code of 
of Civil Procedure; 2. To apply the property to the payment 
of the debts of the decedent ... ; and, 3. To distribute any 
remaining property among those entitled to succeed to the 
property of the decedent, according to the provisions of this 
Title."14 
But two years later this provision was replaced by one which de-
clared that both realty and personalty passed to the heirs, subject to 
the control of the probate court and to the possession of the ad-
9 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 348 (1881); l.ANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURIS· 
DICTION, 2d ed., 145 (1908); Atkinson, "Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction," 
8 Mo. L. REv. 107 at 113 (1943); 3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952). 
10 !I AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952). 
113 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.6 (1952); 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENG· 
LISH LAW, 2d ed., 331-348, 360-363 (1911); 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 
3d ed., §§137-140 (1923); Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in 
America," 42 MICH. L. REv. 965; 43 MICH. L. REv. 113 (1944), reprinted in SIMES AND 
BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 385 (1946). 
12 Land Transfer Act, 60 & 61 Viet., c. 65 (1897). 
13 Atkinson, "The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System," 42 MICH. L. 
REv. 425, 428-439, 443, 448-449 (1943). At the present time, statutes in at least two states 
provide that title to land registered under the Torrens system passes to the personal repre-
sentative. Ga. Code Ann. (1937 §§60-50, 113-801; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §94.405. But 
under the Georgia code, title to intestate land passes to the heir. Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 
1955) §113-901. 
14 Cal. Civ. Code (1872) §1384. See Draft of Civil Code of New York (1862) §508; 
Civ. Code of New York (1865) §638. See also FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 188-190 (1949). 
The matter of determining heirship in actions in partition, actions to quiet title, and the 
like, are not within the scope of the present study. 
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ministrator for the purposes of administration.15 Besides linking 
together the court's control and the personal representative's right 
to possession, this statute restored the common law idea of succes-
sion to real property and in its amended forin was copied by sev-
eral western states which saw fit to follow California's lead in 
codification.16 
This revised statutory statement correctly expresses the prin-
ciple applying throughout the United States today as to title, and 
its plan for conferring possession and control of land upon the per-
sonal representative has had a strong influence in molding the 
law which we find today in slightly more than half the states. An 
increasing number of recent statutes have purported to give the 
personal representative the right to possession of real estate until 
the time has passed during which creditors can present their claims 
or until ordered released or distributed by decree of final distribu-
tion to the heirs or devisees.17 The Model Probate Code expressly 
adopted this statement of the California code concerning title to 
real property and the jurisdiction of the court over it during ad-
ministration,18 and also the provision that the personal representa-
tive should "have a right to, and shall take, possession of all the 
real and personal property of the decedent except the homestead 
and exempt property of the surviving spouse and minor chil-
dren."19 This last provision has since been embodied in the legis-
lation of Indiana in 1953 and of Texas in 1955, which states have 
adopted many of the basic provisions of the Model Probate Code.20 
All of this legislation indicates a trend toward subjecting real estate 
to some measure of control or possession by the personal represent-
ative during the period of administration, which would logically 
15 Cal. Amend. to Code (1873-74) p. 236, now Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §300. A 
code examiner's note to the 1873 amendment states that it was made to avoid "grave 
embarrassment due to doubt as to where the title remains after the death of the intestate 
and before appointment of administrator, also upon the death or resignation of an admin-
istrator or an executor." For other California statutes on this same subject see Cal. Prob. 
Code Ann. (1956) §§571, 581, 582, 1222. 
16Ariz. Code (Supp. 1954) §38-1101; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §152-10-13; Idaho 
Code Ann. (1948) §15-410; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §§91-402, 91-3201; N.D. Rev. 
Code (1943) §30-1304; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 58, §290; S.D. Code (1939) §35.1101; 
Texas Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §37; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-1309. This statute 
was first adopted in Texas in Act of Feb. 14, 1848, §112, as expressing the tradition of the 
civil law. See Thompson v. Duncan, 1 Tex. 485 (1846); Graham v. Vining, 2 Tex. 433 
(1847). 
17 See note 78 infra. 
18 Model Probate Code §84, in SIMES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE I.Aw 41 (1946). 
19 Model Probate Code §124. • , 
20 Ind. Stat. Ann. (1953) §7-701; Texas Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §37. 
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suggest the propriety of having a formal decree ultimately dis-
tributing it to heirs or devisees at the conclusion of the administra-
tion in much the same way that personal property is distributed. 
Even though title to land is generally considered in all jurisdic-
tions to pass directly to the heirs or devisees and not to the per-
sonal representative, how are their interests in it determined and 
by what means do they obtain a marketable title? We shall find 
several different methods as we examine local practices concerning 
the jurisdiction of probate courts over real property. 
First, as already noted, approximately one-half the states do 
not confer upon their probate courts any general control over a 
decedent's land in connection with the usual administration. In 
these states some method is essential to determine heirship which 
will constitute evidence of a marketable title of record in the heirs 
or devisees as to real property. Here informality best describes the 
methods by which a record of heirship is provided, although a 
formal declaration is provided in a few states. 
Second, in states which have expressly given to their probate 
courts jurisdiction over a decedent's land, it is contemplated that 
a decree of distribution shall be made at the conclusion of the ad-
ministration by the court having jurisdiction over the probate 
proceeding. This decree in terms determines the persons who, 
as heirs or devisees, are entitled to the land belonging to the dece-
dent, both as to their identity and as to the shares or portions 
which they are entitled to take. When recorded, it becomes a 
muniment of title. It is a judicial determination of heirship made 
in connection with and as a part of the administration proceeding 
itself, to which the land has been subject, and therefore constitutes 
the highest form of evidence as to the devolution of title. 
Even if legislation exists for such a judicial determination of 
rights of succession in real property, this procedure may not be 
availed of in every instance. Occasionally a decree of distribution 
fails to include a parcel of real property, because of oversight, or 
for other reasons. In this event, if the estate is not reopened, some 
supplementary method is necessary to determine the identity of 
the persons entitled to succeed to the real property. A few statutes 
specify a procedure in such cases. This type of procedure fur-
nishes a third method for determining heirship. 
Fourth, it may be requisite or highly desirable that a deter-
mination of heirship or of devisees be made in connection with a 
pending administration proceeding prior to or as a basis for a 
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decree of final distribution. A statute of descent or distribution 
may need to be construed or applied. A will may need to be in-
terpreted. The members of a class may require ascertainment. 
The identity of a person may be in doubt. Uncertainty as to any 
of these may also affect the amount and apportionment of in-
heritance taxes which must be ascertained and paid before a final 
accounting and distribution can be effected. Other reasons also 
suggest the early resolution of disputed matters with respect to 
ultimate rights of distribution. 
Fifth, when no administration whatever is had upon the estate 
of a decedent, some means is essential to ascertain and declare the 
identity of the heirs or devisees entitled to succeed to the dece-
dent's land and the shares to which they are entitled. A sub-
stantial amount of legislation has been adopted to be used in these 
cases, both in states where probate courts customarily exercise 
jurisdiction over decedents' land and in states where they do not. 
THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION 
As we survey these five general categories we shall be vitally 
concerned with the court's jurisdiction under varying_ circum-
stances to determine, and provide a suitable memorial of, the dev-
olution of ownership of real property. Rights of ownership to 
any property may be tried and determined as between individuals 
in an action in personam. Rights of succession to a decedent's 
property may also be tried and determined as between individ-
uals,21 but judgments or decrees in such cases are of limited value 
in determining rights of succession which third parties will rec-
ognize as sufficient for the purpose of accepting title to property. 
It is not the function of decrees of heirship or of distribution to 
determine the rights of every person in the world in specific prop-
erty. At most they determine rights of succession as to the dece-
21 Such a proceeding is contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, §4. 
However, this procedure is purely inter partes and therefore does not provide a vehicle 
sufficient to determine rights of succession conclusively as against all persons. 3 A.T\f,. LAw 
OF PROPERTY §14.42 at note 26 (1952). See also BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d 
ed., 236, 247, 699 (1941); Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 A. 675 (1930). 
That there may be occasions other than in probate proceedings when courts of general 
jurisdiction may make determinations of heirship in actions in personam is recognized in 
several statutes. See, for example, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §59-2250, wherein it is 
provided: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to divest district courts of power to 
determine descent in any proper proceeding." See also Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 84, 
§256. The situations in which courts of general jurisdiction may need to determine 
heirship is discussed in Jardon v. Price, 163 Kan. 294, 181 P. (2d) 469 (1947), and Bryson 
v. Phillips, 164 Kan. 529, 190 P. (2d) 876 (1948). 
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dent's interest in it. The quantum and quality of the decedent's 
interest must be appraised independently. If, however, rights of 
succession in that interest can be determined so as to command 
universal respect and reliance, a tremendous step will have been 
taken. 
The extent to which this objective can be accomplished de-
pends primarily on the employment of a proceeding for this pur-
pose which qualifies fully as a proceeding in rem. Three factors 
are involved here. First, the property must be located within the 
geographical confines of the court's territorial jurisdiction.22 
Ordinarily there is no problem here in the case of land. Second, 
if a court is to exercise this function, its vestment with power to 
exercise it is a clear requirement for this purpose. Probate courts 
in many states do not possess this power inherently. It must be 
given to them by constitutional or legislative enactment.23 Third, 
granted that they have been given such power, reasonable notice 
must be given to the persons whose interests will be affected, and 
opportunity must then be afforded them to be heard.24 In the 
absence of any of these elements a decree of heirship will be but , 
a questionable marker for proof of succession. 
The matter of notice in these proceedings to determine heir-
ship requires further scrutiny in appraising their effectiveness to 
withstand collateral attack. Concerning proceedings in rem gen-
erally the notice necessary to give jurisdiction to a court need not 
correspond to that for actions in personam: Its purpose is merely 
to notify those interested in the property to appear and assert or 
defend their interests in it. Reasonable methods and forms of 
notice will suffice. For probate proceedings mailing, publishing 
or even posting notice have all been held to be sufficient methods 
of notification.25 Furthermore, if sufficient notice is given at the 
22 JUDGMENTS llEsTATEMENT §32 (1942); Fraser, "Actions in Rem," 34 CORN. L.Q. 29 
(1948). 
:23 JUDGMENTS llEsTATEMENT §7 (1942). See also Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 N.M. 81, 201 P. 
(2d) 1000 (1949), for a thorough discussion of this matter. 
24 JUDGMENTS llEsTATEMENT §32, comments f, g (1942); Fraser, "Actions in Rem," 34 
CORN. L.Q. 29 at 43 (1948). . 
25 JUDGMENTS llEsTATEMENT §32, comment f (1942). It is here said that for actions in 
rem notice by publication or posting may be adequate insofar as unknown claimants are 
concerned, but that a different form of notice to known claimants better calculated to 
reach them may be necessary. See Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 503 (1874); 
Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 29 S.Ct. 580 (1909); Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 
356, 36 S.Ct. 114 (1915); Fuller v. Sylvia, 243 Mass. 156, 137 N.E. 173 (1922). For an 
excellent and detailed analysis of notice requirements in probate and other proceedings 
see comment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951). 
It should also be noted that local statutes often require the giving of a particular 
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commencement of a probate proceeding, no further or additional 
notice would be necessary as to any step in that proceeding unless 
required by local statute,26 because for most purposes an admin-
istration proceeding from the filing of a petition for the appoint-
ment of a personal representative to the decree of final distribution 
and discharge of the personal representative is a single judicial 
proceeding.27 In other words, in the absence of statute requiring 
it, a decree of final distribution in a probate proceeding may be 
made without notice to any of the heirs or devisees other than that 
provided at its commencement. Thus, rights of succession may 
be determined during an administration proceeding without ad-
ditional notice, provided the proceeding adopted for that purpose 
is a part of that administration proceeding. Of course, most states 
require a special kind of notice for various steps in the proceeding 
and this must be complied with if the court's jurisdiction is made 
to depend upon it. 
The question then presents itself as to whether a proceeding to 
determine heirship of real property is to be treated as a part of an 
· administration proceeding. On the basis of historical precedent 
it was not, for probate courts had no jurisdiction whatever over 
land in the ordinary administration proceeding and consequently 
made no judicial determination of rights of succession in it. As 
already mentioned, it was not until comparatively recently that 
real property began to be made subject to the jurisdiction and 
control of probate courts. If this consolidation of real property 
with personal property in some states is considered as complete 
for the purpose of administration, it would seem to follow that a 
determination of rights of succession to it as part of the decree of 
kind of notice before probate or the granting of administration or before various steps 
during administration and may make the giving of such notice a prerequisite to the 
acquisition of jurisdiction by the court to make a decree. While the Mullane case, 339 
U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950) (see note 29 infra), did not involve probate proceedings, its 
requirement of mailing notice to known heirs or beneficiaries corresponds with a modern 
trend of the same character in probate proceedings. Although the methods of giving 
notice for the commencement of probate proceedings are not within the scope of this study, 
discussion of that subject will be found in Fraser, "Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis 
of the Mullane Case," 100 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 305 (1951); Perry, "The Mullane Doctrine-
A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Requirements," in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLA-
TION 32 (1952); 1952 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 612; note, 39 IOWA L. REv. 665 
(1954). 
26 Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem," 43 
MICH. L. REv. 675 at 688-689 (1945). See also Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 
33 S.Ct. 550 (1912). 
27 Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem," 43 
MICH. L. REv. 675 at 689-696 (1945). 
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distribution would be natural and proper and that no separate 
or different notice would be required other than that ordinarily 
given for the distribution of personal property. On the other 
hand, if this jurisdiction and control over real property be thought 
of as merely creating a separate function in the probate court 
which, for the purpose of convenience, has been consolidated with 
its jurisdiction over personal property, then it is possible that it is 
not truly a part of the administration proceeding and that a 
separate and distinct notice would be necessary to satisfy due proc-
ess requirements. In view of the treatment accorded to both 
kinds of property in states where this dual jurisdiction prevails, it 
is quite clear that real property is the subject matter of an admin-
istration proceeding quite as much as is personal property and that 
the notice given at the commencement of the administration pro-
ceeding is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. 
Where probate courts still possess no jurisdiction or control 
over real property in the ordinary administration proceeding, a 
few states have purported to authorize them to make a determina-
tion of heirship as part of, or in connection with, the final account-
ing or decree of distribution of personal property. What is the 
basis for their jurisdiction to make such a determi1_1ation? If this 
is permissible one of two things must be true: either (1) the pro-
bate court acquires jurisdiction over the real property by the 
initiation of the probate proceeding; or (2) the probate court by 
giving notice of the hearing acquires jurisdiction to make a deter-
mination of heirship on final accounting or in connection with the 
decree of distribution. The first theory seems contrary to both 
historical and prevailing notions on the subject unless the mere 
possession of power by the probate court to make a determination 
of succession be regarded in and of itself as bringing real property 
within its jurisdiction. The latter theory, on the other hand, ac-
cords with most existing legislation on the subject which requires 
the giving of a separate notice and tacitly assumes that it is this 
notice which furnishes the basis for the court to make such a deter-
mination. Moreover, if this theory is accepted, it becomes un-
necessary to determine whether the determination of rights of 
succession is a genuine part of the administration proceeding or is 
merely an added function vested in the probate court as a con-
venient tribunal and the one most suited to perform it. In the 
light of precedent and the tenor of existing legislation it is sub-
mitted that only this latter theory constitutes a sound basis for 
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affording recognition to decrees made in this group of states deter-
mining rights of succession to real property. 
When a determination of heirship or of devisees is made in con-
nection with a pending administration which embraces real prop-
erty as well as personal property in order to provide a basis for a 
decree of distribution, there is seldom any question of the court's 
jurisdiction, for the probate court has already acquired jurisdic-
tion of the real property at the commencement of the administra-
tion proceeding. Aside from the requirements of local statutes on 
the subject the court's jurisdiction seems beyond question. 
The method of acquisition of jurisdiction to make a deter-
mination of heirship in the absence of any administration upon a 
decedent's estate involves an area of some speculation. In states 
where probate courts would normally have jurisdiction over real 
property in an ordinary administration proceeding, it is possible 
to think of a determination of heirship in these circumstances as 
a kind of "short form" administration to accomplish the single 
function of determining rights of succession without any other.28 
If this view is adopted, the same kind of notice by which an ad-
ministration is commenced should suffice insofar as due process is 
concerned. Local statutes may require special or further notice. 
In other words, notice requirements for jurisdictional purposes 
may exceed those demanded by due process. If, however, a pro-
ceeding for the determination of heirship is thought of as some-
thing other than part of a true probate proceeding, then notice 
requirements may be more exacting. Under this view a different 
method of notice may be essential. 
If a separate notice is requisite, the next question concerns the 
method of ,giving notice for making a determination of heirship 
in the absence of formal administration. Traditional methods of 
giving notice would doubtless satisfy due process requirements in-
sofar as such a proceeding partakes of the nature of pure probate 
proceedings. But if a proceeding for the determination of heir-
ship in real property is regarded as something essentially separate 
and distinct from a probate proceeding, then it is possible that 
28 If sufficient time has elapsed since the decedent's death and no administration com• 
menced so that creditors have become barred by local law and inheritance taxes have 
likewise become barred or have been paid, a judicial determination of heirship will 
ordinarily suffice to provide a marketable title in real property owned by him. See BASYE, 
CLEARING LAND Tm.ES §§153, 154 (1953). For this reason it has sometimes been character-
ized as a "short form administration." See, for example, Wright v. Rogers, 167 Kan. 297, 
205 P. (2d) 1010 (1949); Heirship of Robinson, 119 Neb. 285, 228 N.W. 852 (1930). 
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more notice than this would be called for under the principle ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank b Trust Company.29 There is some concern by lawyers 
about this possibility, particularly in states where probate courts 
do not traditionally exercise jurisdiction or control over real prop-
erty during ordinary probate proceedings. In addition to notice 
by publication to heirs who are unknown, or whose addresses are 
unknown, several of the recent statutes have expressly provided 
for notice by ordinary or registered mail to all heirs whose ad-
dresses are known30-a requirement which may be indicative of an 
attempt to comply with the minimum notice suggested by the 
Court's opinion in that case. 
Returning now to a consideration of the several procedures 
. which are employed for determining the persons who become en-
titled to succeed to a decedent's real property on his death, it will 
aid our understanding of them if we will keep this underlying 
problem of jurisdiction in mind. We will see, for example, that 
some statutes limit the effect of decrees determining heirship by 
declaring that they shall constitute prima fade evidence only of the 
rights which they declare. If the procedure does not provide the 
ingredients of jurisdiction by the court making the decree, this 
limitation upon its legal effect is only proper. But if a court truly 
acquires jurisdiction over the property before making a decree, 
there is no cogent reason why it should not be given a conclusive 
29 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950). In this case a New York statute required that 
notice by publication be given for the hearing of original accountings of a common trust 
fund managed by corporate trustees. After refusing to classify the accounting procedure 
by such trustees as one in rem or in personam the Court declared (at 317) that publica-
tion alone was not a reasonable method of notice. Admitting that publication was sufficient 
for those beneficiaries whose addresses were unknown or whose interests were "either 
conjectural or future or, although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in 
due course of business come to knowledge of the common trustee," the Court held that 
present beneficiaries whose addresses were known must be notified by ordinary maq. at 
least. 
The administration of common trust funds are relatively new. Judicial proceedings 
for the determination of heirship are also relatively new. The settlement of accountings 
by trustees is very similar to the settlement of accountings by executors and administrators. 
Determining rights of succession in real property is not radically different from determin-
ing them in personal property. The function of settling accountings by trustees adminis-
tering common trust funds in New York, as elsewhere, is vested in surrogate or probate 
courts. Similarly the function of determining rights of heirship or of succession is most 
commonly vested in probate courts. Despite all these elements of similarity the Supreme 
Court refused to classify the former as a proceeding in rem or to say that the same kind 
of notice as would be appropriate in probate proceedings would suffice as to beneficiaries 
whose identity and addresses were known. 
so See particularly the statutes of Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri and Texas, 
discussed under part 5 infra. 
748 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
rather than a presumptive effect, subject only to the right of appeal 
or of vacation for some equitable reason. From the standpoint of 
promoting marketability of titles the consequences are too im-
portant and too far-reaching to justify limitations upon decrees 
rendered by courts having jurisdiction over the property and 
preceded by adequate notice. 
I. Where ,1.dministration Is Had in Probate Courts Having 
No I urisdiction Over Land 
In states where courts of probate generally exercise no juris-
diction over land there is no occasion for a decree to make formal 
distribution of real property along with personal property.31 
There is but a single administration pr<?ceeding and ordinarily it 
is concerned only with personalty.32 It is assumed that the heirs 
or devisees have already succeeded to the real property and that 
the administration proceeding, if properly conducted, will dis-
charge all claims and have the effect of barring creditors. If the 
decedent leaves a will, it will be proven and admitted to probate 
· and thereby become a clear muniment of title as to the devolution 
of any real property. In most instances the will designates the 
devisees by name. But if the decedent dies intestate, or if the will 
does not include a devise of realty, or if the will devises real prop-
erty to a class whose members are not specifically named, there will 
be no corresponding clear muniment of title and no official deter-
mination as to the identity of the persons entitled to succeed to the 
real property. A decree adjudicating as to personalty is not deter-
minative or conclusive of rights to succeed to land also owned by 
the decedent.33 In all such cases proof of title is likely to rest upon 
some less formal and perhaps less conclusive evidence. 
Title examiners in these states commonly rely upon recitals of 
heirship in the various petitions, applications, orders and decrees 
in the administration proceedings.34 More often they accept state-
31 Simes and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 965, 43 MICH. L. R.Ev. 113 at 121 et seq. (1944), reprinted in SIMES AND BASYE, PROB-
LEMS IN PROBATE LAw INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE 385 at 448 et seq. (1946). 
32 If land is devised to an executor or if land is needed to pay debts or legacies, the 
probate court may then acquire certain incidents of jurisdiction or control over it. 
33 JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT §71 (d) (1942); 3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.43 (1952). 
See also Mosier v. Osborn, 284 Ill. 141, 119 N.E. 924 (1918); First Colored Baptist Church 
v. Caldwell, 138 Kan. 581, 27 P. (2d) 237 (1933), rehearing den. 139 Kan. 45, 30 P. (2d) 
144 (1934); McVeigh v. First Trust Co. of Wichita, 140 Kan. 79, 34 P. (2d) 571 (1934); 
Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 N.M. 81, 201 P. (2d) 1000 (1949); State v. O'Day, 41 Ore. 495, 69 
P. 542 (1902) (dictum). 
34BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES §34 (1953); PATION, LAND TITLES §§21, 22,288 (1938). 
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ments as to heirship contained in affidavits or recitals in subsequent 
deeds executed by the heirs themselves.35 There are a few states 
in which the executor or administrator is required to file a list of 
heirs or devisees as part of his official duties,36 but ordinarily no 
judgment, decree or official pronouncement of any kind is made 
to declare those persons to be the ones officially entitled to succeed 
to the real property. Indeed, such a decree, if made, would have 
no binding effect because probate courts in these states ordinarily 
have no jurisdiction over land.37 
This informal method of determining heirs or the identity of 
devisees who are not individually named in a will still prevails in 
approximately half of the American states. Prospective purchasers 
and mortgagees universally rely upon ex parte affidavits and recitals 
in deeds to ascertain the persons from whom they can accept con-
veyances. Only the inherent honesty of people and general neigh-
borhood knowledge keeps such a system from breaking down. But 
it seems to have functioned sufficiently well to date to prevent its 
wholesale abandonment. 
In an effort to make recitals in affidavits or deeds more accept-
able to purchasers and mortgagees, legislation in several states has 
authorized affidavits of heirship to be recorded and has declared 
recitals in them and also in other instruments to be prima fade 
evidence of the facts which they recite.38 Numerous decisions 
have recognized this form of evidence as to heirship.39 Notwith-
35 BASYE, CLEARING LAND Trru:s §§33, 34 (1953); PATTON, LAND Trru:s §288 (1938). 
Real Estate Title Standards in several states have expressly sanctioned this procedure as 
a means of furnishing the basis for a marketable title. See Colo. Title Standard No. 51; 
Conn. Title Standard No. 54; Idaho Title Standard No. 8; Ill. Title Standards Nos. 10, 12, 
15; Ind. (Indianapolis) Title Standard No. 7; Iowa Title Standards Nos. 9.13, 9.18; Minn. 
Title Standard No. 22; Mo. Title Standards Nos. 7, 8, 20; N.M. Title Standard No. 20; 
Ohio Title Standard No. 5.3; Washington Title Standard No. 19. References to real 
estate title standards are collected in BASYE, Cr.EARING LAND TITLES §7, n. 8 (1953). 
36 Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §§632.10; 635.1, 638.34; S.C. Code Ann. (1952) §19-451; Va. 
Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) §§64-127, 64-127.1; W.Va. Code Ann. (1955) §4132. 
37 See note 33 supra. 
38 Ala. Code Ann. (Supp. 1953) tit. 47, §116; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§118-6-7, 
118-6-13 (after having been recorded 20 years); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) §92.08 (after having 
been recorded 20 years); Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1955) §§38-638 to 38-640; Idaho Code Ann. 
(1947) §55-816; Iowa Stat. Ann. (1949) §558.8; Mass. Ann. Laws (1955) c. 183, §5A; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. (1953) §26.731; Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) §507.29 and c. 647; Mo. Ann. 
Stat. (Vernon, 1949) §490.370; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1950) §§76-273, 76-616, 76-634; N.Y. 
Civ. Prac. Act §379 (after having been recorded 15 years); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 
1953) §317.22; S.D. Code (1939) §36.0204; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §§30-1201 to 30-1203; 
Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §52 (after having been recorded 5 years); Va. Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1954) §64-127.1; Wis. Stat. (1953) §§235.46, 327.19. 
39 Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363, 91 N.E. 475 (1910); Dime Savings & Trust Co. v. 
Knapp, 313 Ill. 377, 145 N.E. 235 (1924); Prichard v. Mulhall, 140 Iowa 1, 118 N.W. 43 
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standing its shortcomings this device at least affords a means of 
proving heirship by competent evidence in a judicial proceeding, 
whether the a:ffiant is available or not. In states where probate 
courts are restricted in their jurisdiction and control to a dece-
dent's personal property, some such system is essential for per-
petuating record evidence of succession to real property. 
This informal way of providing information as to the identity 
of heirs or devisees is subject to certain risks because it lacks 
judicial character for rendering it binding upon all persons. Any 
statement or list of heirs, whether filed by the executor or admin-
istrator or prepared by one who purports to know the facts, may 
be erroneous or mistaken, notwithstanding the honesty of the 
person making it. The identity of collateral heirs may actually be 
unknown. Heirs may have been absent or unheard of. For 
example, in Cro~ley v. Calhoon 40 a son who had not been heard 
from during more than twenty years was not included in the list 
of heirs filed by the administrator of his father's estate in Iowa, al-
though his long absence from home was mentioned. After the 
estate had been distributed, it was learned that the missing son had 
migrated to California shortly after the discovery of gold there 
and that just two years before his father's death in 1872 had per-
sonally confessed judgment in favor of a creditor there who later 
proceeded to attach the son's interest in his father's estate in Iowa 
by garnishment of the other heirs. Notwithstanding that the 
estate had been closed for three years and that the list of heirs had 
been filed in the usual manner, the son's interest was recognized 
as an existing one and not as having been foreclosed or determined 
to be nonexistent by the administration proceeding or by the list 
of heirs filed therein. An order approving the personal represent-
ative's final report containing such a list, but without determining 
that the list constituted the heirs who were entitled to the ancestor's 
estate, was not an adjudication of their identity or rights in the 
estate property.41 On the basis of this decision a bona fide pur-
(1908); Siedel v. Snider, 241 Iowa 1227, 44 N.W. (2d) 687 (1950); Van Gundy v. Shewey, 
90 Kan. 253, 133 P. 720 (1913); Austin v. Shipman, 160 Mo. App. 206, 141 S.W. 425 (1911) 
(dictum); Jaeger v. Harr, 62 Ore. 16, 123 P. 61 (1912), rehearing den. 62 Ore. 24, 123 P. 
901 (1912); Bashara v. Glasscock, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 289 S.W. 128; Davis v. Grogan 
Mfg. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) 177 S.W. (2d) 213; Crosby v. Wynkoop, 56 Wash. 475, 106 
P. 175 (1910); Singer v. Guy Investment Co., 60 Wash. 674, 111 P. 886 (1910); Farley v. 
Farley, 136 W.Va. 598, 68 S.E. (2d) 353 (1951); Haumersen v. Sladky, 220 Wis. 91, 264 
N.W. 653 (1936). 
40 45 Iowa 557 (1877). 
41 Crosley v. Calhoon, 45 Iowa 557 at 559-560 (1877); McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Iowa 
37, 282 N.W. 786 (1938); In re Anders' Estate, 238 Iowa 344, 26 N.W. (2d) 67 (1947). 
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chaser from the listed heirs would take no better title than he 
would if the existence or identity of one heir should not be dis-
closed by the administration proceeding. 
About all that can be said for this method is that on the basis 
of experience such verified lists of heirs contained in probate pro-
ceedings or solemnly recited in separate affidavits are likely to be 
correct, but such probability is not likely to satisfy a prospective 
purchaser who desires to invest in land, a home or a piece of busi-
ness property. 
The lack of an effective method to determine rights of succes-
sion to real property in this group of states constitutes a serious 
defect in our system.42 In an attempt to remedy this shortcoming, 
seven states in this group have adopted legislation to provide a 
means for declaring the identity of persons entitled to succeed to 
real property in connection with an administration proceeding 
otherwise concerned only with personal property. The method 
specified in these states for acquiring jurisdiction to make such a 
determination and the legal effect attributed to decrees show con-
siderable variation. Consequently, a thorough analysis of their 
provisions is in order at this point. 
In New York, surrogate courts do not customarily make a de-
cree distributing real estate at the conclusion of an administration 
proceeding.43 Nevertheless they have been empowered to deter-
mine the rights of inheritance and to direct the disposition of real 
property of a decedent who has died intestate or has not devised 
his real property.44 Any heir or transferee of an heir may file a 
petition in the surrogate's court which has acquired jurisdiction 
of the estate,45 describing the property, setting forth the facts upon 
which the jurisdiction of the court depends, and naming all the 
heirs together with the shares to which they are entitled.46 Upon 
the return of a citation directed to each of the heirs named, the 
423 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.43 (1952); PATrON, LAND TITLES §288 (1938); Patton, 
"Omission of Realty in Probate Administration," 42 KY. L.J. 666 (1954). 
43 Although surrogates' courts in New York have not been given jurisdiction over real 
property in the same sense that they have in approximately one-half of the states, the 
personal representative has been given statutory power to take possession of all real prop• 
erty of a decedent unless his will prohibits it or provides that real estate shall not be sold, 
mortgaged or leased or specifically devises it to persons not under disability. N.Y. Dec. 
Estate Law (1949) §§13, 123. 
44 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act §40; Cahill-Parsons N.Y. Civ. Prac. (1946). 
45 The "estate" as that term is employed in the statute refers only to personal prop• 
erty. If the personal representative takes possession of real property pursuant to the pro-
visions of N.Y. Dec. Estate Law (1949) §§13, 123, he will become accountable for the 
income received by him. See note 43 supra. 
46 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act §§311, 312. 
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surrogate is authorized to make a decree declaring the rights of 
"inheritance to the real property which is specifically described. 
A certified copy of the decree may then be recorded and is de-
clared to be "conclusive evidence of the facts so declared to be 
established thereby against all parties to such proceeding."41 
According to the New York statutes, citation is directed to 
each of the heirs named in the petition for determination of heir-
ship and the decree is declared to be conclusive only as against 
"parties" to the proceeding. Obviously the "parties" to such pro-
ceeding are those named in the petition and citation. If a given 
heir was not known or was not named, presumably he would not 
be bound. This difficulty can be and usually is obviated by nam-
ing unknown heirs as parties. Since citation is given by publica-
tion, the decree should be binding upon unknown as well as 
known heirs. Nevertheless in Matter of Clarke48 where an 
adopted daughter of a decedent brought a proceeding for probate 
. of heirship alleging that if her mother left heirs other than herself 
they were unknown to her, and a decree was entered in due time 
after publication of citation to unknown heirs declaring the 
adopted daughter to be the sole heir of her mother, it was held 
that the decree was not binding upon the husband of the decedent 
because he was not a "party" to the proceeding and, therefore, 
that the adopted daughter did not have a marketable title to land 
left by her mother. Apparently the court felt that the identity and 
address of the surviving husband could have been ascertained 
with reasonable diligence and that the statement of facts contained 
in the affidavit furnished in support of an order of publication 
against unknown heirs was not immune to collateral inquiry. Be-
cause of the inconclusive character of the decree under these cir-
cumstances, considerable care has been recommended in alleging 
the efforts used to learn the names and addresses of all heirs of a 
decedent so that the decree ultimately rendered may not be assailed 
as was the one in this case. 
The above statutes are of limited value in that they apply only 
to cases of intestacy and to property of which the decedent died 
seized. This may partially explain why they are seldom used. 
Another statute provides that where it is not necessary or advan-
tageous to mortgage, lease or sell the real property of the decedent, 
the parties may upon any judicial settlement request the court to 
47 Id., §313. 
48131 App. Div. 688, 116 N.Y.S. 101, affd. 195 N.Y. 613, 89 N.E. 1098 (1909). 
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establish who are the owners of any property devised by will or 
who are the distributees entitled to succeed to the real property 
of the estate.49 By following this procedure, rights to property 
devised by will and rights to property owned by the estate at the 
time of distribution as well as rights to intestate property may be 
judicially determined. While this method is followed more often 
in New York than that provided for probate of heirship, it is used 
in only a very small number of cases. In addition to establishing 
the rights and interests of parties to property the decree may direct 
a conveyance to them by the executor or administrator according to 
their respective interests in confirmation of their title. Notice by 
citation to all heirs is required here in much the same way as in 
proceedings to determine heirship but in addition to that given to 
persons taking personal property only. 
Statutes of similar scope but with more limited effect in deter-
mining heirship are to be found in Illinois60 and Ohio51 where the 
decrees are declared to be only "prima fade evidence" of the facts 
found. The Ohio statute provides for notice by personal service 
or by publication as in civil action.52 The Illinois statute leaves the 
manner of giving notice and the persons to whom it shall be given 
entirely up to the court.53 Indeed it is not entirely clear that any 
notice whatever is required. It is hardly to be wondered that de-
crees rendered by probate courts in Illinois have been characterized 
as having no binding effect upon persons who were not named or 
did not personally participate in the proceeding.54 The net effect 
of proceedings authorized in either of these states would appear to 
be essentially that of proceedings in personam. 
The statutes of Ohio and Illinois just described are to be com-
pared with an Arkansas statute55 adopted in 1949 as part of its new 
probate code revision. Under the Arkansas statute any person 
claiming an interest in a decedent's property either as heir or 
through an heir, or the personal representative of the decedent, 
may file a petition in the probate court for a determination of heir-
49 N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act §242. 
50 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1955) c. 3, §§209, 210. 
51 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §§2123.01 to 2123.07. 
52 Id., §§2123.03, 2123.04. 
53 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1955) c. 3, §209. 
54 Prescott v. Ayers, 276 Ill. 242, 114 N.E. 557 (1916); Worsley v. Welch, 317 Ill. 90, 
147 N.E. 379 (1925); Saunders v. Saunders, 323 Ill. 43, 153 N.E. 593 (1926). 
55 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §62-2914. It is not entirely clear whether this proceed-
ing may be had as part of the probate proceeding itself or whether it is an independent 
proceeding under the jurisdiction of the probate court. Probably it may be done either 
way. 
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ship as to any property of the decedent, either real or personal. 
Notice must be given by publication to all persons who claim an 
interest in the property as an heir or through an heir and, in ad-
dition, personal notice or notice by registered mail must be given 
to every such person whose address is known to the petitioner. 
The court is then empowered to make an order determining the 
heirs of the decedent and their respective interests in the property, 
which is declared to be conclusive upon all parties to the proceed-
ing having or claiming an interest in the property. 
Similar legislation applying to real property as to which a de-
cedent has died intestate was adopted in 1955 by Iowa56 where 
provision is made for directing notice to all known heirs, legatees 
or devisees and to all persons unknown claiming any interest in 
the estate of the decedent and also to unknown claimants. Notice 
must then be published for three consecutive weeks, but power is 
given to the judge to prescribe a different notice. No provision 
is made for notifying known heirs personally or by mail. Hearing 
is to be had as in equity and the decree entered is declared to be 
final and binding upon all persons, subject only to the right of 
appeal or to correction, vacation or modification within one year 
for fraud or mistake, but the title of any bona fide purchaser is 
immune to any proceeding to correct, vacate or modify the decree. 
This kind of statute would appear to be highly useful in Iowa 
where the district courts, sitting in probate, have heretofore pos-
sessed no power to determine heirship. Iowa lawyers, however, 
have questioned the effectiveness of the legislation because of a 
feeling that a proceeding of this kind may not be considered an 
integral part of a probate proceeding in which the court is con-
sidered to have jurisdiction over real property and that the notice 
prescribed does not comply with the demands of the Mullane case 
in failing to require at least notice by mail to those heirs whose 
addresses are known. There is also a fear that giving the judge a 
power to prescribe a "different notice" from that specified in the 
statute might authorize him to prescribe a notice less than that 
which would satisfy due process. 
Missouri has also adopted a statute in its 1955 probate code 
revision authorizing its probate courts to determine heirship in 
real property as part of their decrees of final distribution.57 Ac-
cording to the statute the decree is declared to be "a conclusive 
66 Iowa Code Ann. (Supp. 1955) §§636.56-636.60, as enacted by Iowa Acts 1955, c. 267. 
57Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1955) §473.617. 
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determination of the persons who are the successors in interest to 
the estate of the decedent and of the extent and character of their 
interests therein, subject only to the right of appeal and the right 
to reopen the decree." Under this new code, as previously, pro-
bate courts in Missouri have no jurisdiction or control over real 
estate in ordinary probate proceedings. The personal representa-
tive may not take possession of real property unless the court 
orders him to do so for the payment of claims or for its preserva-
tion. 58 Since the court's jurisdiction over real property in the 
ordinary sense of possession and control by the personal represent-
ative is no different from that which it has possessed heretofore, 
some form of new and additional notice to interested parties would 
seem to be necessary. The new code makes express provision for 
this by requiring that general notice of the hearing of final settle-
ment and of petition for distribution shall be given by publication 
to all persons interested in the estate and, in addition, that notice 
shall be mailed to each heir and devisee interested in the estate 
whose name is disclosed by the court records and who has· not 
waived such notice in writing.119 The notice by publication and 
mailing would seem to comply fully with both due process and 
jurisdictional requirements. This legislation, permitting a pro-
bate court to determine heirship and distribute real property by 
decree of distribution without general control over it during the 
administration, is an innovation in American probate law.60 It 
seems fully justified, however, and should prove to be extremely 
useful in providing a judicial muniment of title for proof of heir-
ship in place of affidavits and recitals in deeds and probate pro-
ceedings as heretofore. 
In all six of these states power to make determinations of heir-
ship as to real property has been clearly vested in local courts ex-
ercising probate functions notwithstanding that they do not 
norm.ally exercise jurisdiction over real property as part of an ad-
ministration proceeding. By way of contrast a New Mexico statute 
authorized the probate or district court having jurisdiction of the 
administration of a decedent's personal estate to determine the 
interest of any person who claimed to be an heir or devisee of such 
58 Id., §473.263. 
59 Id., §473.587. 
60 Of the states in this category there may be a determination of heirship or of suc-
cession as to real property in connection with final settlement or distribution of estates 
in Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, New York and Ohio, but only in Missouri is 
there a "distribution" of it. 
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decedent but who was not named in the petition for appointment 
of an administrator or for probate of the will.61 Acting under 
this statute a probate court having supervisory jurisdiction over 
personal property only, proceeded to make a finding of heirship 
as to certain real estate owned by a decedent in connection with 
the final decree. Two persons who were in fact pretermitted heirs 
were omitted from the will and also from the decree. Thereafter 
the question of the validity of that determination arose in an action 
for breach of a covenant of warranty brought in the district court 
involving the same real estate. The Supreme Court of New 
Mexico in a decision rendered in 1949 declared that such deter-
mination by the probate court was not binding because it had been 
given no constitutional authority to determine title to real prop-
erty and that its jurisdiction to determine heirship was confined 
to the personal property over which it had jurisdiction.62 In 
other words the ineffectiveness of the decree was attributable to the 
failure to vest in probate courts the necessary power to determine 
heirship as to real property. In 1951 the New Mexico legislature, 
apprehensive as to the adverse effects upon titles to real property, 
purported to validate all such previous decrees issued by probate 
courts. 63 Whether the statute is effective for this purpose may well 
be doubted.64 Later that same year, however, the New Mexico 
Constitution was amended so as to confer upon probate courts 
jurisdiction to determine heirship in real property.65 Notice of 
hearing for this purpose must be given by publication to all heirs 
of the decedent, both known and unknown, and also served on 
known heirs in the same manner as summons in civil actions.66 
61 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §31-12-6. 
6~Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 N.M. 81, 201 P. (2d) 1000 (1949). After the New Mexico 
Constitution was amended following this decision the Supreme Court of New Mexico in 
In re Conley's Will, 58 N.M. 771, 276 P. (2d) 906 (1954), purported to overrule its holding 
in the earlier case, although its statement to that effect was not necessary to or actually 
involved in the later case. 
63 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §31-12-15. 
64 Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 13 S.Ct. 508 (1893); Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 
N.Y. 474, 25 N.E. 932 (1890), reargument den. 26 N.E. 756; Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 
371, 56 N.E. 838 (1900); Dunkum v. Maceck Bldg. Corp., 256 N.Y. 275, 176 N.E. 392 (1931); 
Bagg's Appeal, 43 Pa. 512, 82 Am. Dec. 583 (1862). In general, see BASYE, Cr.EARING LAND 
TITLES §222 (1953). 
65 N.M. CONST., art. VI, §23. 
66 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §31-12-7. In Harlan v. Sparks, (10th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 
502 at 505, notice of hearing was addressed to "all unknown persons claiming any lien 
upon or right, title and interest in and to said estate." Because the petitioner knew of 
the existence of certain relatives of the decedent and in the exercise of due diligence could 
have ascertained their names and addresses, a decree of heirship rendered under this stat-
ute was held not binding upon them in a subsequent action to quiet title to the decedent's 
real estate. 
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The general objective of legislation for determining heirship in 
these states in which probate courts do not normally exercise 
jurisdiction over real property is to furnish a means for ascertain-
ing and declaring the identity of persons entitled to succeed to real 
property in connection with an administration proceeding other-
wise limited to personal property. Certainly the time is propitious 
and the information for making such a determination is then 
ordinarily most readily available. With the passage of time proof 
of relevant facts becomes increasingly difficult. Furthermore, it 
is entirely fitting that this function should be exercised by tribu-
nals which are already charged with administering decedents' 
estates provided they are presided over by judges sufficiently quali-
fied to pass on questions of heirship or construing wills.67 But it 
is most important that the essentials of a valid proceeding should 
be dictated by legislation which clearly vests power in that court 
to perform this task and also specifies adequate standards of notice. 
The existence of these conditions and compliance with the pro-
cedure prescribed, particularly with that of notice, are necessary 
prerequisites in order that the final product may bear a seal of 
worthiness upon which everyone may rely with complete con-
fidence. 
It is a common provision of most of the statutes considered in 
this category that the decrees rendered shall be recorded and there-
by constitute muniments of title. Even though not recorded they 
constitute competent evidence simply by virtue of the fact that 
they were judicial records. Their legal effect. and value is made 
to vary all the way from prima facie to conclusive evidence. Where 
they are properly made conclusive, their value is clear from the be-
67 The only real objection to a system which authorizes a determination of heirship in 
connection with an administration proceeding is the lack of proper qualifications possessed 
by probate judges in many states. This probably explains the failure of some states to 
confer upon them the power to declare rights in real property under any circumstances. 
This matter was pointedly discussed in Dunham v. Stitzberg, 53 N.M. 81, 201 P. (2d) 
1000 (1949), in which the court said (at 103): "It is a matter of common knowledge that 
probate proceedings are usually ex parte; that probate judges in this state are, with few 
exceptions, not lawyers, and many are ignorant and not fitted for the office. Often they 
sign prepared orders and decrees without reading; or if read, then without understanding 
the import. If in fact these courts had the jurisdiction asserted, it would be exercised in 
most cases without any real trial to determine the fact of heirship. Because of these con-
ditions a statute was enacted authorizing the removal of all proceedings to the district 
court for administration, where the estate exceeds $2,000 in value, precluding any action 
on the part of probate courts in such proceedings. "The legislature can and should enact 
a statute authorizing the district court to determine heirship in all cases whereiQ. real 
estate is left by decedents, after due notice to all claimants, known and unknown, and a 
trial in which the question will be settled by a court learned in the law, with jurisdiction 
to determine it." 
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ginning. Where they are made prima fade evidence only, their 
value as evidence, though less initially, nevertheless increases with 
the lapse of time. 
It is unfortunate that most of this legislation applies to cases 
of intestacy. Its utility would be increased substantially by ex-
tending its application to cases of testacy, particularly where de-
visees are not specifically named. 
2. Where Administration Is Had in Probate Courts Having 
Jurisdiction Over Land 
As previously noted, according to English law the courts ex-
ercising testamentary functions possessed no jurisdiction over land 
until the close of the nineteenth century. Since the organization 
of probate courts in America preceded this development by more 
than a century, we inherited the earlier system which then pre-
vailed in England. Thus it became generally accepted in this 
country that upon the death of a decedent title to his real property 
passed to his heirs or devisees, and his executor or administrator 
had nothing to do with it. 
Notwithstanding this direct passage of title from a decedent to 
his heirs or devisees, real property often does become involved in 
the administration proceeding, for limited purposes, at least. For 
example, it is almost a universal requirement that land be included 
in the inventory of a decedent's estate which is customarily filed by 
his personal representative. 68 Although this requirement serves 
the purposes of determining solvency of the estate, assessing in-
heritance taxes and identifying the land as having belonged to the 
decedent, this procedure alone would hardly justify a conclusion 
that the court thereby obtains jurisdiction over the lind.69 Also 
a proceeding to sell real property to pay debts and legacies may re-
quire the court to direct a disposition of it or assume a control 
over it which it did not previously have.70 Where the personal 
68 Simes .and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MICH. L 
REv. 965, 43 MICH. L REv. 113 at 126 (1944), reprinted in Snrns AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN 
PROBATE LAw 385 at 453-454 (1946). See also Model Probate Code §120 and comment 
thereto. 
69 Lindholm v. Nelson, 125 Kan. 223 at 229, 264 P. 50 at 53 (1928). It does, however, 
identify the land as having belonged to the decedent. See 3 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY §14.41 
(1952). 
70ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., §123 (1953); 3 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY §14.27 (1952); Simes 
and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MICH. L. REv. 965, 43 
MICH. L. REv. 113 at 127 (1944), reprinted in SIMES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 
385 at 455 (1946). 
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representative would ordinarily have no control over real property, 
the court acquires jurisdiction over it by giving some form of 
notice to the heirs or devisees.71 Statutes in most states also vest 
probate courts with jurisdiction to carry out contracts for the 
conveyance of land entered into by the decedent during his life-
time, 72 or to make partition of land for the purpose of distributing 
it to the heirs or devisees.73 Likewise, considerable legislation au-
thorizes the personal representative to bring actions to recover 
possession of or otherwise to seek recognition of the decedent's 
interest in real property.74 All of these attest the court's power or 
potential power over land.75 
Although title is said to be in the heirs or distributees, there 
has been an increasing amount of legislation to give the personal 
representative genuine control over real property as well as over 
personal property. In a few states statutes have given the executor 
or administrator the right to possession of land. The present Cali-
fornia statute, first adopted in 1874, provides: 
"When a person dies, the title to his property, real and per-
sonal, passes to the person to whom it is devised or bequeathed 
by his last will, or, in the absence of such disposition, to the 
persons who succeed to his estate . . . ; but all of his property 
shall be subject to the possession of the executor or adminis-
trator and to the control of the superior court for the purposes 
of administration, sale or other disposition . . . , and shall be 
chargeable with the expenses of administering his estate, and 
the payment of his debts and the allowance to the family 
"76 
Under a statute of this kind the personal representative would 
be expected to take charge of real estate, recover possession of it, 
71 See Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem," 
43 MICH. L. REv. 675 at 683-685, 695 (1945), reprinted in SIMES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN 
PROBATE LAw 489 at 499-502, 515 (1946); BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES 502-506 (1953). 
72 See, for example, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §§850-853; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith• 
Hurd, 1941) c. 3, §406; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 204, §1; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) 
§27.3178 (509); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §525.69; Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §27; Vt. 
Rev. Stat. (1947) §2969; Wis. Stat. (1953) §316.52, In general, see ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., 
§120 (1953). 
73 See, for example, Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§38-1601 to 38-1610; Cal. Prob. Code 
Ann. (1956) §575; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §27.3178 (168); Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) 
§§373-387; Wis. Stat. (1953) §318.30. 
74 See, for example, Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §573; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) 
§733.02; Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §15-410; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §525.34; Wis. Stat. 
(1953) §312.04. 
75 Simes and Basye, "Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42 MICH. L. 
REv. 965, 43 MICH. L. REv. 113 at 121-130 (1944), reprinted in SIMES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS 
IN PROBATE LAW 385 at 448-458 (1946). 
76 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §300. 
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if necessary, and collect the rents and profits therefrom. The 
rights, powers and duties of the executor or administrator over 
real property are so extensive that for all practical purposes they 
are almost the equivalent of title for the limited period of ad-
ministration. Several other states have adopted statutes modeled 
upon the California one.77 A full half of all states have statutes 
expressly providing for possession of real property by the personal 
representative, either as a right or as a duty.78 Since the personal 
representative is subject to the direction and control of the court, 
this alone would suffice as a basis for the probate court's jurisdic-
tion over land. Such a conclusion is emphasized by the specific 
provision of the statute above quoted that the property shall be 
subject "to the control of the superior court for the purposes of 
administration .... " (Italics added.) Another statute makes the 
point even more obvious. Thus the California Probate Code has 
long provided: "Immediately upon the final settlement of the ac-
counts of the executor or administrator, or at any subsequent time, 
... the court must proceed to distribute the residue of the estate 
among the persons entitled thereto."79 
If the court is to distribute real estate, it must effect a transfer 
of title from the decedent to the heir or devisee. Moreover, it 
makes this distribution at the conclusion of the administration pro-
ceeding, thereby recognizing that both the court and the executor 
or administrator have had power and control over the land during 
the period of administration. It is no mere coincidence that legis-
lation directing distribution of real property exists in the same 
states which authorize the personal representative to take posses-
77 Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §14-102; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §91-402; N.D. Rev. 
Code (1943) §56-0103; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1952) tit. 84, §212; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0102; 
Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §37; Utah Code Ann. (1951) §74-4-2. 
78Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §61-6-1; Ariz. Code (Supp. 1954) §38-1101; Cal. 
Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §§300, 581, 582; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §152-10-13; Conn. 
Gen. Stat. (1949) §7035; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) §733.01; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) 
§12014; Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §15-410; Ind. Stat. Ann. (1953) §7-701; Kan. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. (1949) §59-1401; La. Civ. Code (1950) §1659 (if given by testator); Mich. Stat. 
Ann. (1943) §27.3178 (381); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §525.34; Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, 
Supp. 1956) §473.263 (upon order of court when necessary for payment of claims or for 
preservation thereof); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §§91-402, 91-3201; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. (1948) §30-406; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1941) §§9882.106, 9882.191; N.Y. Dec. 
Estate Law (1949) §§13, 123 (statutory power unless will prohibits or provides that real 
estate shall not be sold, mortgaged or leased or specifically devises real estate to persons 
not under disability); N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-1304; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 58, §290; 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §116.105; Pa. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 20, §320.501; S.D. Code (1939) 
§35.1101; Tex. Prob. Code (1955) §37; Utah Code Ann. (1951) §§75-11-3, 75-11-5; Wash. 
Rev. Code (1951) §§11.04.260, 11.48.020; Wis. Stat. (1953) §312.04; Wyo. Comp. Laws Ann. 
(1945) §6-1309. 
79 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §1020. 
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sion of real property. Decrees of distribution in these states truly 
determine rights of succession in the same sense and to the same 
extent that such a decree would do with respect to personal prop-
erty. This method prevails today in approximately one-half of 
the states80 and is finding increasing acceptance in the more recent 
probate· codes. 
After the death of an owner of real estate the title to his prop-
erty is likely to be unmarketable at least until the expiration of 
the nonclaim period following the initiation of administration 
proceedings and perhaps even until it is clear that all debts and 
claims have been paid and all inheritance and estate taxes have 
been satisfied. It is in the interest of certainty of titles that the 
identity of heirs be ascertained and declared as promptly as pos-
sible. The same may be said as to the determination of devisees 
under a will. Although their identity is ascertainable in most 
cases of intestacy or under most wills this is not always true. The 
very existence of certain heirs is not always known. The identity of 
a class of devisees often needs further specification. A formal decree 
of distribution rendered for this purpose by the probate court as 
an important part of its larger function of exercising complete 
jurisdiction over the decedent's real property in the administra-
tion proceeding is the ideal means of accomplishing this end. It 
can then be recorded and made a muniment of title upon which 
others can rely with absolute assurance. Such is the procedure 
authorized by the more modem probate codes81 and likewise rec-
ommended by the Model Probate Code.82 
80 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §61-17-2; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939 and Supp. 1952) 
§§38-1504, 38-1505; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §§1020, 1021; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) 
§152-14-6; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7056; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §734.03; Hawaii 
Rev. Laws (1945) §§9648, 12014, 12402 (15); Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §§15-1306, 1307, 
1315; Ind. Stat. Ann. (1953) §7-1102; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §59-2249; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §§27.3178 (165), (166); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §525.481; Mo. 
Ann. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1955) §473.617; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947; Supp. 1955) 
§§91-3901, 91-3902; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1948) §§30-1302, 30-1303; Nev. Comp. Laws 
(Supp. 1941) §§9882.233, 9882.243, 9882.244; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §562.1; N.M. 
Stat. Ann. (1953) §31-12-12; N.D. Rev. Code (1943; Supp. 1953) §§30-2110, 30-2111; 
Okla. Stat. Ann. (1951, Supp. 1955) tit. 58, §§631, 632; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§117.320, 
117.630; Pa. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 20, §§320.734, 320.735, 320.756; S.D. Code (1939) 
§§35.1705, 35.1708; Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §408 (b); Utah Code Ann. (1951) 
§§75-12-7, 75-12-8; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §11.76.050; Wis. Stat. (1953) §318.06; Wyo. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945; Supp. 1955) §§6-2305, 6-2306. 
In Louisiana a judgment of possession serves substantially the same function as a 
decree of distribution in other states. It is not specifically referred to in the Louisiana 
Code but is required by the Louisiana Inheritance Tax Act. 
81 See note 80 supra. 
82 Model Probate Code §183. 
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3. Where Administration Is Had in Probate Court Having 
Jurisdiction Over Land but Decree of Distribution Fails To 
Include Real Property 
Where a determination of heirship or of devisees is thus made 
an integral part of a decree of distribution, it normally determines 
the persons entitled to succeed to real property either by the laws 
of intestacy or by the terms of a will and then proceeds to distri-
bute it to them. Abnormally such a decree may fail to include 
within its terms some particular piece of real property. This 
omission may be due to lack of knowledge of its existence as an 
asset of the estate, to an oversight and consequent failure to in-
clude it in the decree of distribution, or to a misdescription of it 
in the decree. It may or may not have been omitted from the in-
ventory.83 In any case there is a need for some device to correct 
the error or to supplement the omission. The orderly solution 
would be to reopen the estate and amend the decree of distribu-
tion to make the necessary determination. The usual procedure 
then becomes available, as previously shown, of determining suc-
cession to the land in order to effect its proper distribution, though 
belatedly, to the persons entitled to it .. Some legislation embodies 
this very procedure.84 It is the method advocated by the Model 
Probate Code.85 
Notwithstanding the obvious expediency of this procedure sev-
eral statutes provide for a separate or independent proceeding to 
determine heirship or rights of succession under these circum-
stances.86 This type of legislation merely assumes that a determina-
tion of heirship or of distributees by a supplementary proceeding 
following normal administration can be just as efficacious as re-
opening administration. If this method is followed, it is important 
83 An omission or misdescription of land in an inventory should not affect market• 
ability so long as it clearly appears that the decedent owned it at the time of his death. 
The inventory is not a true muniment of title. Several title standards have expressly 
declared that such an omission or misdescription shall not affect marketability. Mo. Title 
Standard No. 25; Neb. Title Standard No. 3; N.H. Title Standard No. D-14; Ohio Title 
Standard No. 5.1. See also Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §76-606; Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 
1955) tit. 58, §692.I. In general, see BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES §§273, 332 (1953). 
84 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §§6-2310 to 6-2312. 
85 Model Probate Code §194. See also comment to §195. 
86 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§152-4-1 to 152-4-7; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) 
§734.25; Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §§15-1701 to 15-1708; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) 
§§59-2250 to 59-2252; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§27-3178 (145) to (149); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
(Supp. 1954) §§525.314 to 525.316; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1948) §§30-1701 to 30-1704 
(intestate estates); Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §§48-56. 
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to follow faithfully the prescribed procedure to insure that the 
court acquires jurisdiction over the property and persons in order 
to make the decree concerning the devolution of ownership. Such 
legislation generally recognizes this by requiring that notice by 
citation or otherwise be given to heirs, devisees and others in-
terested in the estate. In addition, notice by publication is re-
quired by some statutes.87 The decree rendered pursuant to these 
requirements furnishes a suitable muniment of title exhibiting the 
devolution in ownership of real property. 
4. Where Determination of Heirship Is Made Ancillary to 
Administration Proceeding 
Even though administration is had on a decedent's real and 
personal estate and even though a decree of distribution would 
determine heirship or distributees in due course, there may be 
occasions when a separate determination may be desirable, or even 
necessary, before a decree can be framed in the administration pro-
ceeding itself. There may be an ambiguous will, there may be a 
gift to a class of persons whose identity is uncertain, there may be 
rival claimants, either as heirs or devisees, to the same interest in 
the estate, or there may be pretermitted heirs. An identification 
of all living heirs may be necessary in order to notify them of a 
proposed sale of real property by the personal representative. In 
each of these instances it may be highly desirable to resolve such 
conflicts in the early stages of a pending administration. In addi-
tion, the amount and apportionment of inheritance taxes are 
necessary items to b~ ascertained, often long before the final decree 
can even be thought of. Even if only the resolution of conflict as 
to the identity of heirs or devisees is involved, it may be an eco-
nomical use of the time to have a determination made before the 
expiration of the time for closing the estate rather than to wait 
until that time and then attempt the determination. It may make 
a difference to the individuals involved so that they can govern 
their activities in accordance with a sure knowledge of their in-
terest in the estate. An adversarial resolution of such conflicts 
concurrent with routine administration can facilitate the closing 
of an estate which might othenvise be delayed for months or even 
years. 
87 Publication of notice is provided for in Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nebraska and Texas. In some instances publication is required only as to non-
resident heirs or unknown heirs. 
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The California statute, one of the oldest in this group, provides 
that "when the time to file or present claims against the estate has 
expired, and a petition for final distribution has not been filed, the 
executor or administrator, or any person claiming to be an heir of 
the decedent or entitled to distribution of the estate or any part 
thereof may file a petition setting forth his claim or reason and 
praying that the court determine who are entitled to distribution 
of the estate."88 In addition to the usual notice by posting, the 
petitioner· must cause notice of the hearing to be mailed to the 
executor or administrator and to all legatees and devisees and to 
all known heirs of the decedent and all persons who have requested 
notice. Any person may then appear and file a written statement 
setting forth his interest in the estate. Upon a hearing the court 
determines those who are the heirs of the decedent or are entitled 
to distribution of the estate and then specifies their interests. 
When the decree thus rendered becomes final, it is conclusive as 
to related matters determined during the remainder of the ad-
ministration of the estate and also upon any subsequent proceed-
ing for distribution. 
Analogous statutes have also been adopted in many other states 
where probate courts normally exercise jurisdiction over real prop-
erty.89 In Utah it has been held that the probate court has in-
herent power to determine heirship at any time during an ad-
ministration proceeding without statutory sanction.90 The utility 
of this procedure is attested by the numerous cases in which it has 
been invoked in order to determine rights in estates in advance of 
final distribution. A simple application of the laws of succession 
only may be involved; or an interpretation of"a complex will may 
be required. Thus power is given to a probate court to construe 
a will during an administration proceeding in order to pave the 
way for an orderly decree of distribution.91 Persons claiming to 
88 Cal. Prob. Code Ann. (1956) §1080. 
89 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §§61-17-1 to 61-17-3; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) 
§§38-1518 to 38-1521; Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §62-2914; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) 
§§152-3-1 to 152-3-5; Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §734.25; Idaho Code Ann. (1947) 
§§15-1701 to 15-1709; Ind. Stat. Ann. (1953) §6-606; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§27.3178 (145), 
(146), (147); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947; Supp. 1955) §§91-3801 to 91-3803; Neb. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. (1948) §§30-1701 to 30-1708 (if administration has been dormant for 2 years); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§117.510 to 117.560; Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §§48-56; 
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §§6-2313 to 6-2316. 
90 Child v. District Court of Second Judicial District, 80 Utah 243, 14 P. (2d) 1110 
(1932). 
91 In re H=e's Estate, 62 Ariz. 273, 157 P. (2d) 347 (1945); Burton's Estate, 93 Cal. 
459, 29 P. 36 (1892); Bacon v. Baoon, 150 Cal 477, 89 P. 317 (1907). 
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be pretermitted heirs frequently invoke these statutes to assert 
their rights to a distributive share of an estate.92 Since their func-
tion is strictly probate in character, a jury trial is not essential on 
constitutional grounds.93 Nevertheless a jury trial has been made 
optional in some states. 94 
Ordinarily there is no problem of jurisdiction here. In states 
where probate courts have jurisdiction over real property as part 
of their general supervisory control over the estate as a whole, a 
determination of heirship is but one step in the administration of 
the estate which is clearly in rem.95 Even in these states some ad-
ditional notice to interested parties is customary and is usually 
required by statute.96 
Proceedings of this kind to determine heirship prior to decree 
of final distribution have been declared to provide a "simple and 
expeditious method for determining who are the rightful heirs of 
an estate and entitled to the distribution thereof."97 Undoubted-
ly they serve to obviate useless and unnecessary repetitive hearings 
and provide a timely means of determining rights of succession so 
that a final report and account can be prepared with certainty, 
thereby paving the way for a decree of final distribution to follow 
without needless controversy over conflicting interests in the estate. 
Thus they exist principally as an adjunct to implement the entire 
administration proceeding in the orderly accomplishment of its 
purposes. 
5. When No Administration Is Had 
It has already been shown that, according to traditional theory, 
title to a decedent's real property passes directly to his heirs or 
devisees immediately upon his death. This theory as to its devolu-
92 Brainard Estate, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 850, 174 P. (2d) 702 (1946); Rawnsley Estate, 
106 Cal. App. (2d) 500, 235 P. (2d) 223 (1951). 
-93 Miller v. O'Brien, 75 Colo. 117, 223 P. 1088 (1924); Brawley v. Thomas, 82 Ohio 
App. 400, 81 N.E. (2d) 719 (1947). See also Watkins Estate, (Cal. App. 1940) 104 P. (2d) 
389, 16 Cal. (2d) 793, 108 P. (2d) 417, 109 P. (2d) 1 (1940), construing statute prior to 
1941 amendment. 
94 A jury trial is now expressly provided for in California and New York. 
95 Estate of Wise, 34 Cal. (2d) 376, 210 P. (2d) 497 (1949); In re Baxter's Estate, 98 
Mont. 291, 39 P. (2d) 186 (1934). In the latter case one heir was not named or notified. 
In holding that he was nevertheless bound because the proceeding was part of an admin-
istration proceeding which was in rem and of which all the world had notice, the court 
cited and relied on Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 29 S.Ct. 580 (1909), cited note 25 supra. 
See also Blythe's Estate, 110 Cal. 231, 42 P. 643 (1895). 
96 Statutes in substantially all of these states require that notice of hearing be pub-
lished. In addition, all but two or three require personal service of citation upon resident 
parties, at least. Mailing is directed in Arkansas and Colorado. 
97 Estate of Wise, 34 Cal. (2d) 376 at 384, 210 P. (2d) 497 at 501 (1949). 
766 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
tion correctly describes the matter in a general way, both in states 
where probate courts have no jurisdiction over real property in an 
administration proceeding and also where they do have such juris-
diction. But the estate of every decedent is not subjected to formal 
administration. 
When a decedent dies intestate, ownership of his real property 
devolves upon individuals answering the statutory description of 
heirs. But statutes cannot identify them as individuals-an iden-
tification which is essential to enable them to exercise their full 
rights of ownership. When a decedent dies testate, his will when 
admitted to probate operates to transfer ownership and usually 
names or designates the persons to whom his real property passes 
and therefore constitutes a muniment of title for that purpose. 
Even here there are certain instances in which the identity of 
devisees cannot be ascertained from the language of the will. 
There may be a gift to a class or to individuals not specified by 
name, so that there is a lack in the elements necessary to constitute 
a clear muniment of title. Additional evidence may be necessary. 
In cases where administration is not had, methods for ascertain-
ing the identity of those persons who are entitled to succeed to real 
property have been made available to a considerable extent. The 
power to make such a determination has usually been vested in 
courts exercising probate jurisdiction, both in states where they 
normally have no power or control over real property in an ad-
ministration proceeding and also where they do have such power. 
It is important to observe at the outset that conferring this power 
upon probate courts normally having no jurisdiction over real 
property constitutes a genuine addition to their previous func-
tional powers. On the other hand, giving this power to courts 
usually exercising probate jurisdiction over real property con-
stitutes no grant of additional power. 
As already noted, an administration proceeding is considered 
to be a proceeding in rem in the sense that it concludes all persons 
with respect to property constituting the estate subject to admin-
istration.98 In order to accomplish its function, however, the court 
having supervision of the estate must acquire jurisdiction over it 
in the first instance. This it does usually by giving reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard in the initial steps of the pro-
ceeding. 99 Subsequent steps in the proceeding are simply in-
98 Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem," 43 
MICH. L. REV. 675 (1945). 
99 Id. at 687-696, as to the necessity and kind of notice for the court to acquire juris-
diction. Comment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951). 
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dividual steps of a single large proceeding which possesses this in 
rem characteristic. A determination of distributees made at the 
conclusion of an administration proceeding as to property of the 
estate which is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, whether it 
is personal property only or both real and personal property, would 
be binding upon all persons. 
When power is vested in a probate court to make a determina-
tion of succession in the absence of any administration proceeding, 
it must first acquire jurisdiction over the property with respect to 
which its determination will apply. In discussing the statutes 
which have thus far been adopted to provide for such a determina-
tion of succession, it is convenient to classify them according to 
whether the court would ordinarily have jurisdiction of personal 
property only or of both real and personal property. Special at-
tention will be given to the character of notice required in order 
for the court to exercise its authority to determine heirship under 
these conditions. 
(a) In States Where Probate Courts Would Normally Ex-
ercise No Jurisdiction Over Real Property. An Illinois statute,100 
first passed in 1909, purports to authorize courts having probate 
jurisdiction to ascertain and declare the heirship of a decedent if 
there is no grant of administration whatever. The persons to be 
notified and the manner of giving notice are left entirely to the 
discretion of the court. Upon hearing, the court is allowed to 
make its ascertainment of heirship from "an affidavit of any party" 
or from evidence in narrative form or by questions and answers, 
which information is then filed with the clerk and becomes a part 
of the files. Since the court has no control or jurisdiction over 
the decedent's real property in a full administration proceeding, 
it would seem an anomaly that it would be authorized to make a 
binding decree in this summary fashion without first getting juris-
diction over the real property or requiring that all persons who 
have interests in the real property, and who would be affected by 
the decree, be made parties to the proceeding. The legislature 
doubtless recognized the shortcomings of this proceeding, which is 
little more than ex parte, for in another section it provides that an 
order so made by the court shall be only prima facie evidence of 
heirship and that any other legal method of proving heirship may 
be resorted to by any party interested in any place or court where 
the question may arise.101 The Supreme Court of Illinois has 
100 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1954) c. 3, §209. 
101 Id., §210. 
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also stated on several occasions that such orders declaring heirship 
are prima fade only and are not intended to be binding upon 
persons who were not notified or did not participate in the pro-
ceedings.102 In other words, the court's determination has little, 
if any, value as evidence other than that which an affidavit of heir-
ship would have, because it is not based upon any semblance of 
jurisdiction over the property or over all possible parties whose 
interests are affected.103 The Illinois court is fully aware of this 
for on one occasion it described this procedure as being merely in 
the nature of a proceeding for the perpetuation of testimony.104 
Legislation in New York and West Virginia has purported to 
· authorize their surrogate and circuit courts, respectively, to deter-
mine heirship in land of decedents who have died intestate.105 In 
these states a petition may be presented by an heir setting forth the 
names of the persons believed to constitute the heirs of the dece-
dent. A citation or order is then issued and served upon all parties 
who appear from the petition thus filed to have any interest in the 
property. In addition, notice is given by publication to non-
resident or unknown heirs. The determination of heirship when 
made is recorded and is then declared to be conclusive against "all 
parties to such proceeding."106 The effectiveness of decrees ren-
dered under these statutes depends on the extent to which affidavits 
for service upon nonresident or unknown heirs are immune to 
collateral inquiry.107 
In Mississippi, jurisdiction has been conferred upon chancery 
to determine the persons who are entitled to succeed to the owner-
ship of property belonging to a person who has died intestate. A 
petition for this purpose may be filed by any heir or other person 
interested in any of the property.108 Jurisdiction is obtained by 
the issuance and service of a citation directed to all heirs of the de-
cedent and also by publication of summons directed to them which 
is publish~d as other publications to absent or unknown defend-
102 Prescott v. Ayers, 276 Ill. 242, 114 N.E. 557 (1916); Worsley v. Welch, 317 Ill. 90, 
147 N.E. 379 (1925); Saunders v. Saunders, 323 Ill. 43, 153 N.E. 593 (1926). 
103 Of course, if the determination were made in probate proceedings and interested 
parties appear and contest the matter, the decree would be binding upon those parties in 
a subsequent proceeding, such as a partition suit. See Healea v. Verne, 343 Ill. 325, 175 
N.E. 562 (1931). 
104 Welch v. Worsley, 330 Ill. 172, 161 N.E. 493 (1928). 
105·N.Y. Surrogates' Court Act §§311, 312; W.Va. Code Ann. (1955) §4088. 
100 N.Y. Surrogates' Court Act §313; W.Va. Code Ann. (1955) §4088. See discussion of 
this same New York legislation applying in another connection at notes 46-49 supra. 
101 See Matter of Clarke, 131 App. Div. 688, 116 N.Y.S. 101, affd. 195 N.Y. 613, 89 N.E. 
1098 (1909), discussed at note 48, supra. 
108 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §1270. 
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ants.109 A decree entered upon the conclusion of publication is 
declared not to be assailable collaterally except for fraud, to be 
binding upon all persons cited to appear from the date of its 
rendition and upon all persons whomsoever after the expiration of 
two years.11° 
An Arkansas statute,111 adopted in 1949 as part of a new pro-
bate code,112 authorizes any person claiming as or through an heir 
of a decedent to initiate proceedings for the determination of 
heirship in the probate court of proper venue for the administra-
tion of such decedent's estate. The petition must contain all 
relevant data concerning the decedent and his domicile, his heirs 
or their assigns, a description of the property, the net value of the 
entire estate, a statement as to whether the decedent died testate 
or intestate, and if testate, a copy of the will and a certificate of 
probate thereof. Notice is given to all persons known or believed 
to claim an interest in the property as or through an heir of the 
decedent, to all persons shown by the public records to claim an 
interest through the heirs of the decedent, and to any unknown 
heirs of the decedent. Notice is made by publication and, in ad-
dition, by registered mail to every such person whose address is 
known to the petitioner. After proof of service the court is em-
powered to determine the heirs of the decedent and their respec-
tive interests as heirs in the property, which is declared to be con-
clusive upon all parties to the proceeding having or claiming an 
interest in the property.113 This statute also permits a determina-
tion of heirship when an administration proceeding on personal 
property is pending or has been completed. 
In Iowa, where courts handling probate matters ordinarily 
have no jurisdiction over real property, there had long been felt 
a need for a proceeding that would effectively determine heirship 
or devisees in the absence of administration. Such a statute was 
finally adopted in 1955 by which, if no letters are issued within 
five years after a decedent's death, any person may initiate proceed-
100 Id., § 127 I. 
110 Id., §1272. 
111 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §62-2914. 
112 Ark. Acts 1949, Act No. 140. 
113 The order is subject only to the right of appeal or to be set aside upon such 
grounds and under such circumstances and in the manner provided by law for setting 
aside a final judgment or decree of a court of general jurisdiction. The court is authorized, 
however, upon the petition of any person not personally served with notice having or 
claiming any interest in the property involved, filed within three years after the date of · 
the rendition of the order or within three years after the removal of the disability of 
any person subject thereto, for good cause, to vacate or modify the order insofar as it 
affects the interests of such person. 
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ings to determine heirship independent of administration.114 
Notice is directed to all known heirs, legatees or _devisees and all 
persons unknown claiming any interest in the estate and is pub-
lished for three consecutive weeks, but there is no requirement 
that notice be given personally or sent by mail to any party. Pro-
vision is made, however, that the judge may prescribe a different 
notice. Hearing is had as in equity and the decree entered is de-
clared to be final, subject only to the right of appeal and to be 
binding upon all persons. Since an in rem determination of heir-
ship as to real property by itself has not previously been consid-
ered a probate function in the strict sense and since the proceed-
ing as employed here is unassociated with a probate proceeding 
embracing either real or personal property, there is some uncer-
tainty among Iowa lawyers as to whether the notice required by 
the statute is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.115 
Legislation similar in character to that of Iowa was embodied 
in the new Missouri Probate Code also adopted in 1955.116 A 
petition to determine heirship may be filed in the probate court 
whenever no administration has been commenced on the estate 
of a decedent and no will offered for probate within five years after 
his death.117 Provision is included for giving notice by personal 
service or registered mail and also by publication to all persons 
known or believed to claim an interest in the property as or 
through an heir of the deceq.ent, to all persons shmm by the public 
records to claim an interest through the heirs, and to all unknown 
heirs. Such notice would appear not to be subject to the same ob-
jection of the Iowa statute described above but to be clearly ample 
for the court to acquire jurisdiction to determine heirship and 
thereby furnish a muniment of title upon which prospective pur-
chasers may rely with confidence.118 
In New Mexico two sets of statutes now authorize both dis-
trict courts and probate courts to determine heirship of decedents 
who have been dead for more than six years and left real property 
in the state.119 Upon filing a petition for the purpose, notice of 
114 Iowa Code Ann. (Supp. 1955) §§636.56-636.60, as enacted by Iowa Acts 1955, c. 267. 
115 See discussion at note 56 supra. 
116 Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1955) §473.663. 
117 A will may not be admitted to probate nor letters of administration granted_ after 
five years. Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1955) §473.070. 
118 The statute provides that the decree shall be recorded and shall be conclusive 
. evidence of the facts determined thereby. 
119 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§31-12-16 to 31-12-21 (in district courts); N.M. Stat. Ann. 
(1953) §§31-12-22 to 31-12-27 (in probate courts). See discussion at notes 61-66 as to the 
power of probate courts in New Mexico to determine heirship as to real property. 
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hearing, which shall include a description of the property de-
scribed in the petition, is published and also given to all known 
heirs in the same manner as is provided for the notice of hearing 
of the final report in the administration of estates.120 The court 
is directed to have the property appraised and to determine the 
amount of succession tax which must be paid before any order 
determining heirship shall become final.121 Since probate courts 
as well as district courts in New Mexico now have power to deter-
mine heirship, there seems to be no question as to the validity of 
decrees rendered for this purpose provided all heirs are made 
parties and properly notified.122 
(b) In States Where Probate Courts Would Normally Ex-
ercise Jurisdiction Over Real Property. A substantial quantity 
of legislation for the purpose of determining heirship in the ab-
sence of administration has also been adopted in states where pro-
bate courts would normally exercise jurisdiction over real prop-
erty. A Colorado statute is an excellent model.123 It provides 
that when any person shall die intestate leaving real property in 
that state or shall die a resident of the state leaving intestate per-
sonal property, any person claiming to be an heir of the decedent, 
or a grantee of an heir, or any person claiming an interest in such 
property may, after one year from the death of such decedent, if 
no administration shall have been granted, apply to the district 
court or, if the value of the property does not exceed $2,000, to the 
county court, stating to the best of his knowledge the names, ad-
dresses and relationship to the decedent of all heirs entitled to any 
interest in such property, and the name and address of the present 
owner thereof. The court or clerk shall then issue a notice of the 
filing of the petition which shall include the name of the decedent, 
a description of the property set forth in the petition and the 
names of the alleged heirs and present owner, which notice is 
then published at least once a week for four successive weeks, 
served personally upon all persons residing in the state whose 
names and addresses are shown in the petition and also mailed to 
all persons whose names and addresses are shown in the petition.124 
120 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§31-12-19 and 31-12-25. Notice of hearing of a final 
account and report is given in the same manner as summons is served in a civil action and 
also published. Id., §31-12-7. 
121 Id., §§31-12-18 and 31-12-24. 
122 For a New Mexico case allowing a collateral attack on a decree obtained without 
naming certain heirs whose identity and address could have been ascertained see Harlan 
v. Sparks, (10th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 502, discussed in note 66 supra. 
123 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §152-4-2. 
124Id., §152-4-2. 
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Upon a hearing the court is authorized to determine the heirs of 
the decedent and the present owners of the property and to issue a 
decree to that e:ffect.125 Here we see a judicial process which is 
genuinely one in rem, where the court has power over the prop-
erty within its territorial jurisdiction, asserts and obtains jurisdic-
tion by mailing notice to and personally serving all interested 
persons within the state, mailing notice to those outside, and pub-
lishing notice as to all others. Moreover, any heir or grantee of 
an heir who has not been personally served with notice of the 
hearing or appeared thereat may move to reopen the decree at any 
time within six months.126 Certainly this would satisfy the most 
extreme requirement for obtaining jurisdiction over the property 
and declaring the identity of those who are entitled to succeed to 
its ownership. 
Statutes similar to the Colorado one above described exist also 
in approximately a dozen other states where probate courts would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over real property in an adminis-
tration proceeding.127 To obtain their benefits an application is 
filed by an heir or other person in the court which would exercise 
probate jurisdiction setting forth the fact of the decedent's death, 
a description of the property left by him and the names of all the 
heirs so far as known to the petitioner. A time and place for hear-
ing is then set. Service of citation or notice upon all known heirs 
whose names appear and who can be found within the state is re-
quired by most and notice by publication is required by all of 
them.128 Since the court in which the proceeding is filed would 
125 Id., §§152-4-4, 152-4-5. 
126 Id., § 152-4-5. 
127 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §734.25; Idaho Code Ann. (1947) §§15-1401 to 15-1405, 
15-1701 to 15-1709; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §§59-2250 to 59-2252; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
(1943) §§27.3178 (145) to (149); Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) §§525.31, 525.311, 525.312; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1948) §§30-1701 to 30-1708; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§30-2201 to 
30-2213; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1952) tit. 84, §§251 to 261; Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) 
§§48-56; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §§75-12-33, 75-12-34; Wis. Stat. (1953) §§315.02 to 315.06; 
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §§6-2601 to 6-2604. 
12s Nebraska requires notice by publication only. Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1948) §30-1702. 
Michigan requires personal service on parties in the county or by publication or by reg-
istered mail or by a combination of any two of these methods. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) 
§27.3178 (32). Wisconsin requires personal service in or out of the state or by publication 
and mailing to all persons whose addresses are known or with reasonable diligence can be 
ascertained. An order of court authorizing publication shall also direct service by mail to 
all. If the order does not specifically designate the parties to whom notice is to be mailed, 
it shall be deemed to refer to those whose names are set forth in the petition. The 
statute further provides that such an order and record shall be conclusive in all collateral 
actions and proceedings as to the knowledge and ascertainability with reasonable diligence 
of the names and addresses of persons interested. Wis. Stat. (1953) §324.18. This elimi-
nates the possibility of collateral inquiry as to the adequacy of notice as occurred in 
Matter of Clarke, 131 App. Div. 688, 116 N.Y.S. 101, affd. 195 N.Y. 613, 89 N.E. 1098 (1909), 
discussed at note 48 supra. 
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have jurisdiction to determine heirship in a full administration 
proceeding, it may be argued that notice by publication or even 
by posting would suffice if that would be the only notice required 
for an administration proceeding.129 Notice by personal service 
or mailing in such a case may be in accordance with additional 
local requirements for an administration proceeding. On the 
other hand, if a proceeding to determine heirship to real property 
in these states is deemed not to be a probate function because it is 
unassociated with a probate proceeding, then personal notice or 
notice by mail to all known heirs may be in order on the theory 
that the principle of the Mullane case may be applicable here.130 
As yet no case has passed upon this point. As previously men-
tioned, however, it is believed that if the notice required to de-
termine heirship in any of these states corresponds to the require-
ments to initiate an administration proceeding in the same state, 
then all possible requirements of notice will have been satisfied. 
It is worthy of note that an increasing number of these statutes 
authorize a determination of persons entitled to succeed to either 
real or personal property.131 Most of them, however, are limited 
to cases of intestacy.132 Notwithstanding that decrees of heirship 
in these states appear to possess all the elements of valid in rem 
decrees, they have been limited in two other ways in some states. 
In Michigan they are declared to be prima fade evidence only 
unless fifteen years shall have elapsed since the death of the de-
cedent.183 And in Wisconsin they are declared to be presumptive 
evidence only of the facts of heirship found, but conclusive evi-
dence as to heirs to whom notice shall have been given or who 
shall have appeared.134 The Texas Probate Code makes them 
conclusive as to all parties who were personally served with cita-
tion or notice and as to nonresident parties and bona fide pur-
chasers from any of them, but prima fade evidence only as to 
others.135 This would exclude resident parties who were not 
served or were not known and therefore not made parties by name. 
129 See discussion at notes 28-30 supra. 
130 See discussion at note 29 supra. 
131 Among the states considered in this group the statutes of Florida, Idaho, Minnesota 
and Texas purport to apply to both real and personal property. 
132 The statutes of Florida, Minnesota and Texas purport to apply to cases of testacy 
as well as intestacy. Of course, the will would need to be admitted to probate in order to 
have legal effect and for the court to determine devisees or legatees under it. 
133 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §27.3178 (149) (where determination of heirship is not 
made as part of an administration proceeding). If made in an administration proceeding, 
it is conclusive. See note 80 supra. 
134 Wis. Stat. (1953) §315.06. 
185 Texas Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §55. 
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Also because of the fact that decrees in these- cases are frequently 
founded on service by publication and therefore may affect in-
terests of persons who may not in fact learn of them until after 
their rendition some statutes contain liberal provisions to permit 
persons who were not personally served to move to set aside the 
decree and open up the proceedings for further proof.136 
(c) Effect of Determination in Providing Complete Market-
ability of Title. Another significant feature of these statutes, 
with the aid of supplementary legislation, is their effectiveness in 
providing a full marketable title to land. It is well known, of 
course, that two of the basic purposes of administration upon the 
estate of a decedent are to discharge all indebtedness due from him 
or his estate and to make distribution of the residual property to 
the persons entitled to it. In most states statutes of limitations ap-
plicable to the debts of a decedent cease to run upon his death. 
When a personal representative has been appointed and notice 
given to creditors to present their. claims, statutes of nonclaim re-
place statutes of limitations to bar or extinguish the decedent's 
debts. Logically it would seem to follow that the failure to initiate 
administration proceedings upon the estate of a decedent would 
result in leaving the claims of creditors extant and thereby impair 
marketability of titles perpetually in such cases. However, a very 
substantial amount of legislation has been adopted by the states 
in question to free land from the claims of creditors after the ex-
piration of a period of time during which no one takes steps to-
ward formal administration.137 
It will be noted that a large portion of the statutes providing 
for a determination of heirship in the absence of administration 
do so only after the expiration of a stated period of time after the 
decedent's death.138 It is more than a coincidence that the periods 
136 See, for example, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §59-2252; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1952) 
tit. 84, §254. 
137 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) §62-2601 (5 years); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. {1953) 
§§152-7-2, 152-7-3 (1 year); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §734.29 (3 years); Iowa Code Ann. 
(1949) §633.47 (5 years); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §59-2239 (1 year); Mich. Stat. Ann. 
(1943) §27.3178 (430) (6 years); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §525.431 (5 years); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
(Vernon, Supp. 1955) §473.070 (5 years); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1948) §30-609 (2 years); 
N.M. Stat. Ann (1953) §31-8-4 (6 years); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §10509-159 
(4 years if real estate aliened or encumbered to bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer by 
heirs prior to issuance of letters); Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) tit. 58, §471.1 (3 years); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §12.190 (6 years); Tex. Prob. Code (Vernon, 1955) §74 (4 years); 
Wis. Stat. (1953) §316.01 (3 years); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §§6-915, 6-916 (2 years). 
138 Colorado (1 year); Idaho (2 years); Iowa (5 years); Kansas (1 year); Minnesota (5 
years); Missouri (5 years); Nebraska (2 years); New Mexico (6 years); North Dakota (6 
months); Oklahoma (3 years); Utah (3 months); Wisconsin (60 days); Wyoming (2 years). 
In Idaho and Wyoming creditors may be notified of the hearing for the determination 
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provided by these statutes correspond closely to those for freeing 
land from the claims of creditors when administration has not been 
had. The net result is to afford a means of providing a full 
marketable title to property in the heirs to the same extent that it 
was marketable during the lifetime of the decedent, subject only 
to the claim of the state for inheritance and succession taxes. 
Many of these statutes provide for a determination and payment 
of these taxes as a routine requirement in their use. But legisla-
tion has not been uncommon in these same states to bar even the 
demands of the state for taxes after the expiration of time without 
assertion.139 Where the claims of creditors have thus become 
barred, the procedure for determining heirship then serves to 
provide a complete basis for establishing marketable title to real 
property by succession from a decedent without administration. 
Conclusion 
Proceedings for the determination of heirship have been 
adopted to function in a wide variety of circumstances. In states 
where probate courts ordinarily exercise no jurisdiction over real 
property there is but scant legislation for that purpose. Some of 
the older statutes have made the proceeding of such a character 
that the resultant decree has a value little more than that of a self-
serving affidavit. The increased. value of a decree in such cases 
arises only when interested persons appear and litigate their com-
peting claims. Even here there is nothing to approach the effect 
of an in rem decree. The more recent legislation has sought to 
provide notice to interested parties in order to constitute the pro-
of heirship and their interests barred in that proceeding. Idaho Code Ann. (1947; Supp. 
1955) §§15-1402 to 15-1404 and Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2602. The same provi-
sions appear in Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §§30-1702 to 30-1704, but it has been held not to 
confer rights on creditors which they would not otherwise have. Heirship of Robinson, 
119 Neb. 285, 228 N.W. 852 (1930). 
139 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1949) §§63-147, 63-148 (7 years); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) 
§138-4-36 (15 years); Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §198.22 (10 years); Idaho Code Ann. (1947) 
§14-405 (5 years after commissioner of finance notified of death); Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-
Hurd, 1954) c. 120, §397 (5 years as against purchaser); Ind. Stat. Ann. (1953) §7-2430 
(5 years); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §79-1529 (10 years); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §9284 
(3 years); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §77-2037 (5 years); N.Y. Tax Law §249-j (15 years 
after accrual); N.Y. Tax Law §249-11 (15 years after accrual if assessed value of property 
does not exceed $10,000, but if application for release of lien is filed and denied, the tax 
is presumed to be paid and ceases to be a lien 6 years after such denial); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
(1953) §.118.230 (6 years after state treasurer notified; 7 years as to nonresident decedent); 
W.Va. Code Ann. (1955) §850 (10 years); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §6-2110 (5 years 
after death in case of resident decedents or after notice of death has been filed with 
Inheritance Tax Commissioner as to nonresident decedents). 
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ceeding one truly in rem and make it binding upon all persons 
insofar as it may determine who is entitled to succeed to the de-
cedent's interest in property. 
Where probate courts do exercise a real jurisdiction over real 
property, their decrees of final distribution make the desired de-
termination of heirship or of distributees, thereby serving as a 
protecting guide to the personal representative in making dis-
tribution as well as becoming a decree binding upon the whole 
world and serving as a genuine muniment of title. Also when the 
decree of final distribution fails to include some particular piece of 
property, we have noted a substantial amount of legislation pro-
viding a summary procedure to correct the oversight. 
Proceedings for the determination of heirship probably serve 
special needs best in two situations: (1) when they are resorted to 
before the decree of final distribution in connection with an ad-
ministration proceeding in order to determine the rights of ulti-
mate distrib:utees; and (2) when there has been no administration 
whatever. When used in connection with a pending administra-
tion, they make possible a timely determination of conflicting in-
terests which obviates possible delay in closing the estate and mak-
ing prompt distribution to interested parties who look forward to 
receiving their proper shares of the estate. When resorted to in 
the absence of administration, they can and sometimes do serve 
as a substitute for a summary administration, provided creditors 
have become barred according to local law by their failure to take 
steps to assert their interest. 
Several trends may be observed in the enactment of legislation 
for this purpose. First, there is some tendency to permit deter-
minations of rights of succession in states where probate courts do 
not normally have anything to do with real property and to do· so 
in a way that will be binding upon all parties. Second, there is 
increased use of this procedure to resolve conflicts in connection 
with pending administrations. Third, there is a greater inclina-
tion to authorize a procedure for this purpose in the absence of ad-
ministration and thereby simplify problems for certain classes of 
persons, particularly those succeeding to small estates. Fourth, 
there is an increasing number of statutes which extend their ap-
plication to personal property as well as to real property. Finally, 
there are marked indications of broadening existing procedure 
by authorizing a determination of rights under wills as well as 
under the laws of intestacy. All of these are beneficial as well as 
logical extensions of their original functions. 
